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1Outline of Talk
•Climate change is a market failure
•Climate and energy facts
•Economically efficient policy design
•Economics of Domestic Legislation
2Problem:  Excess Radiative Forcing, measured in Watts per meter squared
3Climate Change is a Global 
Environmental Externality
• The risk of global climate change is an 
external cost of greenhouse gas 
emitting activities.
» The price of fossil fuels doesn’t include the 
cost to the environment.
4CO2 Emissions Drive Increased 
Concentrations
5Uncertainties
• Uncertainty in costs and benefits of 
mitigation
• Uncertainty in timing, extent, and 
location of impacts 
• Uncertainty about relationship between 
concentration and temperature
6Source:  http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/globalghg.html
Cross-country Comparison of Carbon Emissions Over Time
(Not Counting Deforestation and Other Important Sources)
7Source:
EPA
Source:  EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2007
 
(April 2009)
8What is an efficient policy 
outcome?
• Level of climate protection that maximizes 
net social benefits.  
• Need least cost abatement & efficient long 
run stabilized concentration.
• Costs of mitigation justified by benefits of 
climate risk reduction.
9Complications
• How to monetize human health and 
ecological effects of climate disruption? 
• Who bears costs and who benefits are 
different  
• Is mitigating climate change the best way 
spend the incremental dollar to help the poor 
and vulnerable?
10
Mitigation Benefits
•Benefits of mitigation = net damages avoided
•Technical challenge:  Quantify, monetize, and compute 
present discounted value of uncertain benefits
•Appropriate discount factor is uncertain, but very 
important – long time horizon 
•Est. present value of benefits :
» $10 to $351 per ton of carbon
11
What is 
the level 
of risk?
Thought 
experiment: 
T to 2100, 
no policy
Source:  MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/resources/gamble/no-policy_F.html
12
We buy a 
better wheel if 
we stabilize 
concentrations, 
e.g. at approx 
550 ppmv
Source: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
http://globalchange.mit.edu/resources/gamble/policy_F.html
13
A Price on Emissions Internalizes the 
Externality
• Economy-wide market-based incentive to 
cut emissions
• Cap-and-trade system or tax
• Economy-wide,  all GHG’s
14
Climate Change – 
Other Market Failures
• Basic technology and science – a public 
good
• Early deployment?  Maybe, maybe not.
• Infrastructure coordination
15
Robust lessons from Economics
• Minimize costs by providing flexibility
» What
» When
» Where
» Who
• Least cost abatement means 
equalizing marginal costs 
16
Cap-and-Trade vs. Carbon Tax
•Can be similar, depending on details
•Cap provides more environmental 
certainty and tax provides more economic 
certainty.
» More efficient to set prices than a strict cap 
•Both systems result in higher prices for 
energy and energy-intensive products.
17
Cap-and-trade
• Set total allowable emissions in a given period
• Allocate allowances.
• Allow trading.
• Require covered entities to hold allowances
» Can be upstream or downstream
• Firms use allowances to cover emissions with 
abatement costs above trading price.
• Price signals passed along up and down the 
supply chain.
18
Source:  CBO Approximate Value of SO2
Allowances in 2005
Approximate Value of CO2 Allowances 
in 2020 Under Legislative Proposals
19
The relative prices 
of fuels change
• Put a price on carbon- 
equivalent emissions
• Changes relative prices of 
inputs and outputs based 
on carbon content of 
energy
• Economic activity 
incorporates cost of 
emissions 0
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Economics of Cap-and-Trade
Reduction 
from BAU
$/ton C equiv
Marginal 
abatement 
cost
Allowance Value
GHG reduction as a result of the program
Area = total direct 
cost of abatement
cap
Zero 
emissions 
point
P
21
Categories of Economic Effects
• Costs to the U.S. Economy
» Direct abatement costs
» Economic drag from higher real price levels
• Transfers
» Transfer from those who pay higher prices to those 
who receive them.
• Benefits from avoided climate damages
22
What Affects Costs
• Stringency of targets
• Details of cap-and-trade design
• Provisions other than cap-and-trade
23
Waxman-Markey, HR 2454
• Passed House in June 2009
• Title 3 is Cap-and-trade
• 1418 pages
• 17 % reduction relative to 2005 by 2020
• 83% reduction by 2050
24
Source:  US Chamber of Commerce
25
Economic Analysis Compares 
Action to Inaction
• The benefits and costs depend on  the 
difference between:
• The Reference Scenario
» Also called: Business As Usual, BAU, 
Baseline
• The Policy Scenario
26
US Emissions under HR 2454 from Six Models
Source:  CRS Report R40809
Reference Scenarios
Policy Scenarios
27
HR 2454 Allowance Prices in Eight Models
Source:  CRS
28
HR 2454 Energy Prices from EPA Analysis 
(change relative to baseline)
Source:  EPA
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EPA Analysis of HR 2454
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EPA Estimates for GDP per Capita under HR 2454
Source:  CRS
Policy Scenarios
Reference Scenarios
31
Percent decline in GDP per Capita under HR 2454
Source:  CRS
32
Effect of Alternative Policies on US Employment
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33
“Where Flexibility”: Offsets
•Reduces overall cost of achieving cap
•Requires baselines and additionality
•Leakage
•Permanence, for forest projects
•Tradeoff between close monitoring/conservative 
baselines and cost
•Large income from selling international offsets 
could discourage developing countries to take a 
target
34
Bills rely heavily on international 
offsets to control costs
• Without international offsets, carbon price 
would increase 65% to 250%*
• Over $1.2 trillion in international offset 
purchases projected by EPA through 2050
• At beginning of the program, offset payments 
could be over six times the cost incurred for 
domestic abatement in covered sectors.
*Source:  CRS Report R40809
35
Revenue Recycling Can Greatly 
Lower Costs
•Allowance auction revenue can offset the 
macroeconomic drag of higher real price levels.
•Using revenue to reduce the federal budget 
deficit or other taxes can reduce costs of the 
program by 15% to 70%.
•Reducing tax rates benefits higher income 
households most.
» Clear tradeoff between efficiency and equity
36
Cost of a 15% cut in CO2
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Allowance Giveaways Can Raise Costs
•Allocating to local energy distribution companies 
to lower energy bills will blunt the incentive to 
conserve energy. 
•Requires more abatement elsewhere at higher 
cost
•Could raise overall costs by 12 to 15 %*
• *Source:  Karen Palmer, Resources for the Future, Testimony before 
Senate Energy Committee, 10/21/2009
38
Price Collar
• Sets a floor and ceiling on allowance prices
• Safety valve for ceiling and reserve price on 
allowance auction for floor
• Prevents price from going off the rails, but do 
nothing if predictions are correct.
• Even if price ceiling binds, emissions effects 
can be modest, depending on the collar 
parameters.
39
Illustrative Price Collar
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Allowance PriceSource:  Congressional Research Service
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